Veri able secret sharing schemes (VSS) are secret sharing schemes dealing with possible cheating by the participants. In this paper, we propose a new unconditionally secure VSS. Then we construct a new proactive secret sharing scheme based on that VSS. In a proactive scheme, the shares are periodically renewed so that an adversary cannot get any information about the secret unless he is able to access a speci ed number of shares in a short time period. Furthermore, we introduce some combinatorial structure into the proactive scheme to make the scheme more e cient. The combinatorial method might also be used to improve some of the previously constructed proactive schemes.
Introduction
One important topic in cryptography is how to securely share a secret among a group of people. In some cases, many people need to share the power to use a cryptosystem. Thus some secret information should be shared by a group so that the cryptosystem can be used only if it is permitted by a speci ed subset of the group. The study of how to keep a secure backup of a secret key and how to recover it securely has been rst studied by Blakley 4] and Shamir 23] independently. Shamir proposed a polynomial threshold scheme. In a (t; n)-threshold scheme, a secret value is shared by n participants such that any t of the participants can reconstruct the secret value by putting their shares together, but any t ? 1 participants cannot get any information about the secret value. In such a scheme, an adversary needs to compromise at least t locations in order to learn the secret, and corrupt at least n ? t ? 1 locations to destroy the secret.
In many situations, such as cryptographic master keys, data les, legal documents, etc., a secret value needs to be stored for a long time. In these situations, an adversary may attack the locations one by one and eventually get the secret or destroy it. To prevent such an attack, proactive secret sharing schemes are proposed. Proactive security for secret sharing was rst suggested by Ostrovsky and Yung in 18] . In 18] they presented, among other things, a proactive polynomial secret sharing scheme. Proactive security refers to security and availability in the the presence of a mobile adversary. Herzberg et al. 15 ] specialized this notion to robust secret sharing schemes and gave a detailed e cient proactive secret sharing scheme. In their scheme, a secret value is shared by n servers. The mobile adversary is able to attack all the servers during a long period of time. However, since the corrupted servers can be rebooted, in any time period there are only a subset of servers that are corrupted. \Robust" means that in any time period, the servers can reconstruct the secret value correctly.
The scheme in 15] is based on Shamir's polynomial threshold scheme, thus most aspects of the scheme are unconditionally secure. However, their scheme depends on veri able secret sharing schemes based on 9, 19] which depend on some cryptographic assumptions.The security of the scheme in 9] is based on the hardness of solving discrete logarithm. In the scheme of 19], the privacy of the secret is unconditionally secure, but the correctness of the shares depends on a computational assumption. In a sense, these two schemes complement each other.
The purpose of this paper is to provide a new proactive secret sharing scheme which is unconditionally secure, i.e., the security of any part of the scheme is not based on any cryptographic assumption. Let S be the set of possible secret values, where jSj = q. Then unconditional security of the scheme means that at any time the adversary cannot guess the shared secret s 2 S with probability better than 1 q . We rst propose an unconditionally secure veri able secret sharing scheme. This scheme is an improvement of the absolute VSS in 3]. Then we propose several protocols to make it proactive. Following from the method of 15], the lifetime of the secret is divided into periods of time in the proactive scheme. In each time period, the n shares will be renewed while the secret remains the same. In this way, a mobile adversary who is able to attack (learn or corrupt) at most b shares (where n > 3b + 1) in a time period cannot learn any information about the secret in the long lifetime. This scheme is also robust, i.e., the secret can be reconstructed at any time.
Furthermore, we introduce some combinatorial structures in the scheme so that the scheme will be more e cient. With the combinatorial structure, most of the computation of the system will depend on the parameter b. Thus there is a \trade-o " between the computation and the value of b: when b is smaller (the ability of the adversary is more limited), the computation takes less time. Thus our scheme is more e cient in the situation when the number of the possible corrupted servers are much smaller as compared to the total number of the servers in the system. On the other hand, our combinatorial method might be easily adapted to the scheme of 15] to make the scheme more e cient.
The rest of this paper is arranged as follows. In Section 2 we give some preliminaries and the main settings of the system. Section 3 describes our new veri able secret sharing scheme. We also propose an anonymous VSS in a subsection. Section 4 describes the proactive scheme without combinatorial structure. Section 5 introduces the combinatorial structure and describes how to apply it to the proactive scheme.
Preliminaries

Previous work
Proactive refers to the security of the scheme in the presence of a mobile adversary who may corrupt all participants of the scheme throughout the lifetime of the system but cannot corrupt too many participants during any short period of time. Such a mobile adversary was rst considered by Ostrovsky and Yung in 18] .
The motivation of 18] is to combat mobile viruses. The scheme requires the participants to constantly exchange messages and to be able to erase parts of its memory. A polynomial secret sharing proactive scheme is proposed which uses the veri able secret sharing scheme of 22]. Herzberg et al. 15] further discussed proactive secret sharing schemes and gave a detailed practical scheme. In their scheme the lifetime is divided into periods of time. At the beginning of each time period, the share holders engage in an interactive update protocol which includes a share recovery protocol and a share renewal protocol. At the end of the period, each shareholder holds completely new shares of the same secret. The secret will not be computed during the update phase while it can be reconstructed at any time. They used the polynomial-based method from 18] for the renewal protocol. They also proposed a polynomial-based method for share recovery protocol. The veri able secret sharing schemes they used are from 9, 19] .
There are also many papers that discuss proactive security, see e.g., 6, 14, 11, 21] and their references. Our discussion will mainly follow the papers 15, 18].
The setting
We will follow the setting of the scheme in 15, 18] . We assume that there is a system of n servers P 1 ; P 2 ; ; P n , which are connected to a common broadcast channel such that messages sent through this channel instantly reach every server. We also assume that the system is synchronized, i.e., the servers can access a common global clock, and that each server has a local source of randomness. To make things simpler, we assume that there are private channels between each pair of servers and that messages sent by broadcast are safely authenticated. With these assumptions, we are able to focus on the proactive scheme itself.
There is an adversary which can corrupt b servers during any time period. Corrupting a server means learning the secret information in the server, modifying its data, sending out wrong message, changing the intended behavior of the server, disconnecting it, and so on. Since the server can be rebooted, the adversary is a mobile one. A secret value s 2 GF(q) will be shared by the servers through the scheme. The value of s needs to be maintained for a long period of time. The life time is divided into time periods which are determined by the global clock. At the beginning of each time period the servers engage in an interactive update protocol. The update protocol will not reveal the value of s. At the end of the period the servers hold new shares of s. The mobile adversary who correpts b servers in a time period cannot get any information about the secret value s. The system can reproduce s in the presence of the mobile adversary at any time.
We consider unconditional security in this paper, which means that the adversary cannot guess the secret with probability better than 1 q if the secret s 2 GF(q).
Veri able secret sharing
Since secret sharing schemes were proposed initially by Shamir 23] and Blakley 4], research on this topic has been extensive. In the \classic" secret sharing schemes, there are assumed to be no faults in the system. Tompa and Woll 26], and McEliece and Sarwate 17] rst considered schemes with faulty participants and gave partial solutions for that problem. In their schemes, the dealer is always assumed honest. Chor et al. 8] rst de ned the complete notion of Veri able Secret Sharing (VSS), and gave a solution which is based on some cryptographic assumption. In a VSS, each holder of a share can verify that the share is consistent with the other shares. Thus both the dealer and other participants can be veri ed in such a scheme. There are two aspects of the security in a VSS. One is the security of the secret and the other is the security of the veri cation.
There are many papers which have discussed VSS recently. Most schemes use zeroknowledge proofs, e.g., 3, 7, 10, 13, 20, 22] . Others use cryptographic assumptions such as the hardness of discrete logarithm, see 9, 19] . 12] proposed a simple and e cient VSS, but it based on some \collision resistance" assumption. On the other hand, many known VSS are not easy to adapt for proactive property.
The VSS in 22, 19, 9] are used in proactive schemes in 18, 15] . 18] used the VSS from 22] which used some zero-knowledge proofs. 15] used the VSS of Feldman 9] and Pedersen 19] . The security of the scheme in 9] is based on the hardness of solving discrete logarithm. In the scheme of 19], the privacy of the secret is unconditionally secure, but the veri cation depends on a computational assumption.
In 3] it was shown that in any unconditionally secure VSS, b < n 3
. Thus the VSS with b n 3 will either depend on some cryptographic assumption or have small propability of errors. In this section, we will propose an unconditionally secure VSS with b n?2 3 , which is simpler and more e cient than the scheme in 3]. Moreover, our scheme is easy to transform into a proactive scheme.
De nition
Now we give a formal de nition of VSS as follows.
Suppose there are a dealer D and n other participants P 1 ; P 2 ; ; P n all connected by private communication channels. They also have access to a broadcast channel. There is a static adversary A that can corrupt up to b of the participants including the D. Here static means that the b participants controlled by the adversary are xed.
Let be a protocol consisting two of phases Share and Reconstruct. Let S be the set of possible secret values. At the beginning of Share, the dealer inputs a secret s 2 S. At the end of Share each participant P i is instructed to output a Boolean value ver i . At the end of Reconstruct each participant is instructed to output a value in S.
The protocol is an unconditionally secure Veri able Secret Sharing protocol if the following properties are hold: 
The new VSS
In this subsection we provide a new unconditionally secure VSS which will be used in our proactive scheme later. Suppose there is a dealer D and n participants P i ; 1 i n, where n t + 2b + 1 and t > b. Let S = GF(q) be a nite eld and let ! be a primitive element in GF(q). In the following protocol, all the computations are in the eld GF(q). We rst state the share phase as follows. where a 00 = s and a ij = a ji for all i; j. Then, for each k, D sends h k (x) = f(x; ! k ) to P k through a private channel. 2. After receiving h k (x), each P k sends h k (! l ) to P l for 1 l n; (l 6 = k) through a private channel.
3. Each P l checks whether h k (! l ) = h l (! k ) for 1 k n; (l 6 = k). If P l nds, for at least n ? b ? 1 values of k, that h k (! l ) = h l (! k ), then P l accepts the shares and outputs ver l = 1, and P l also records all the P k for those k which causes h k (! l ) 6 = h l (! k ) in a list l . Otherwise, P l refuses the shares and outputs ver l = 0.
Next we consider the reconstruct phase. Note that although the adversary is static, he could provide correct information in Share phase but wrong information in Reconstruct phase. Reconstruct 1. For each P i with ver i = 1, P i sends h i (0) to P k , where P k is not in the list i . 2. After receiving h i (0), P k computes a polynomial f k (0; y) such that f k (0; ! i ) = h i (0) for at least n ? b of the data he received.
3. P k computes and output s 0 = f k (0; 0). We prove that the protocol is an unconditionally secure VSS in the following theorem.
Theorem 3.1 The above scheme is an unconditionally secure veri able secret sharing scheme. Proof We prove that the above scheme satis es the conditions of the VSS as follows.
1. If a good player P i output ver i = 0, then h i (! l ) 6 = h l (! i ) for at least b + 1 values of l. Since we assume that at least n ? b ? 1 other players are good, h i (x) is not consistent with at least one good player. On the other hand, if the good player P i 's share is incorrect, then his share is consistent with at most t ? 1 good players, since shares lie on a polynomial of degree t ? 1. Since b + t ? 1 < n ? b ? 1, P i will output ver i = 0.
2. If the dealer is good, then the good player receives f(x; ! i ). Since f(x; y) is symmetric, f(! l ; ! i ) = f(! i ; ! l ) for all good players P l . Thus ver i = 1.
3. If all the good players P i output ver i = 1, then all of their shares are consistent with each other, since n ? b ? 1 > b. Therefore they will construct the same polynomial in the Reconstruct protocol, when n t + 2b. We can use the algorithms from 24] to do this e ciently. If the dealer is good, then a good player P k will have f k (0; y) = f(0; y). 4 . Suppose the adversary controls b shares. Without loss of generality, we assume that he knows h 1 (x); h 2 (x); ; h b (x). It is easy to show (see, e.g. Remark. This scheme is modi ed from Blom's key predistribution scheme (see 5] for the details). For simplicity, our description used a Reed-Solomon code instead of general MDS codes. It is straightforward to generalize our scheme by using MDS codes.
An example
We display a toy example in this subsection. Let q = 13; ! = 2; n = 8; t = 3 and b = 2. Suppose the dealer D is good. First D selects a polynomial as follows:
f(x; y) = 3 + 9x + 2x (12; 10; 10) Suppose that P 1 received a wrong polynomial, say, h 0 1 (x) = 2 + 6x + 3x 2 . Assume that P i , 1 i 6, are good players. P 1 will receive the values 9; 8; 11; 11; 0 from P 2 ; P 3 ; P 4 ; P 5 ; P 6 respectively and nd h 0 1 (! 4 ) = 8 6 = 11, h 0 1 (! 5 ) = 3 6 = 11 and h 0 1 (! 6 ) = 12 6 = 0. Note that there are at most two good players' data which will agree with h 0 1 (x), since the degree of h 0 1 (x) is two. So P 1 will output ver 1 = 0, since P 1 has at most four values agreeing with h 0 1 (x).
If there are at most two bad players, then each good player's share will be con rmed by the other 5 good players, so they will all output 1 at the end of Share.
At the Reconstruct phase, there are at most two incorrect values in the total eight values, so the good player can compute the secret value using the methods of 24].
VSS without dealer
Secret sharing without dealer means that there is no dealer in the scheme, who knows and distributes the secret. Secret sharing without dealer is rst considered in 16]. One such secret sharing scheme is considered in 19].
We can remove the dealer from our scheme as follows. The other properties of the scheme are the same as in the previous subsection. In this scheme, each player in turn plays the part of the dealer. Thus the security of scheme follows from Theorem 3.1. We need only to show that each good player has the same list L, which is obvious.
Remark. As we indicated before, our VSS is modi ed from Blom's key predistribution scheme. In the original scheme, there is a dealer to construct the schemes. Using the methods of this section, we obtain a key predistribution scheme without dealer.
New proactive scheme
In this section, we describe our proactive secret sharing scheme without combinatorial structure. We will add combinatorial structures in this scheme to improve the e ciency of the scheme in next section.
Initialization
In the initial step, we assume that there is a dealer who set up the scheme. After the initialization phase, the dealer will no longer be needed.
In the initialization, we use the share phase of the VSS described in the Section 3, but we assume that t > b + 1. The rst two steps are the same. Then we do the following.
3 0 : Each P l checks whether h k (! l ) = h l (! k ) for 1 k n. If P l nds that for at least n ? b ? 1 of the n ? 1 values of k, h k (! l ) = h l (! k ), then P l accepts the shares and outputs ver l = 1, and P l also broadcasts accusations against all the P k for those k which causes h k (! l ) 6 = h l (! k ) in a list l . Otherwise, P l refuses the shares and outputs ver l = 0. 4: If at least n ? b of the servers output \1", then the dealer erases all the information about the scheme. Otherwise, the dealer reboots the whole system and initializes the system again.
After the system is successfully initialized, the system will determine the bad servers as follows. A server will be determined to be bad if and only if it is accused by at least n ? b players in the system. Thus at the end of the initialization phase, every good server holds the same list of bad servers L. Note that some accusations might be made by bad servers, but we assume that n ? b of the servers are good.
Share renewal
In the share renewal phase, all good servers do the following:
1. Each server P l selects a random symmetric polynomial where r 00 = 0 and r ij = r ji for all i; j.
2. P l sends h (l) k (x) = r (l) (x; ! k ) to P k for k = 1; 2; ; n by a private channel and broadcasts h Remark. We can remove the private channels in step 2, since our scheme is also a key predistribution scheme and the server P i and P j can use h i (j) = h j (i) as a key to communicate securely.
To check the security of the renewal phase, rst we note that any coalition of at most b servers cannot get any information about any shares except their own. In fact, a server P i only knows h (l) i (x) and h (l) 0 (x). Since b < t ? 1, the coalition of b servers knows at most t ? 1 polynomials which cannot reveal r (l) (x; y) (see, e.g., 5]). Secondly, from the protocol we know that every good server should have the same list L. Therefore, the good servers will keep consistent shares after renewal.
Note that a good server P l can be accused by at most b servers. In this case, P l will broadcast b polynomials in its defense. Thus P l will broadcasts total b + 1 polynomials. Since t > b + 1, these information will not reveal r (l) (x; y). On the other hand, suppose P l gives P i a wrong share, i.e., the share P i received is not consistent with at least n?b 2 other servers (the majority of good servers). Then P i will accuse P l in step 4, since n?b 2 > b. If P l broadcasts a correct share in the defence, then P i can correct his share. Otherwise, P l will be found to be bad.
Recover a share
When a server is corrupted or replaced, it needs to be rebooted and thus it needs to recover the secret shares.
We rst provide a protocol, to detect the corrupted servers, which we call detection. Detection 1. P l computes and sends h l (! k ) to P k for k = 1; 2; ; n by private channels. 2. P k checks whether h l (! k ) = h k (! l ). P k then broadcasts an accusation list k which contains those l such that h l (! k ) 6 = h k (! l ) or h l (! k ) was not received. 3. Each good server updates the list L so that it contains those l accused by at least b + 1 servers of the system.
After running Detection, the system will recover the shares for all server P l , where l 2 L.
The recovery protocol is as follows.
1. For each l 2 L, every good server P i computes and sends h i (! l ) to P l . 2. Upon receiving the data, P l computes a polynomial h l (x) such that h l (! k ) = h k (! l ) for the majority of k it received, using the algorithms of 24]. P l sets h l (x) as its shares.
Reconstruct the secret
The reconstruction protocol is similar to the Reconstruction of VSS introduced in Section 3. We need only to change the rst step as follows.
1' For each good server P i , P i sends h i (0) to P k , where k is not in the list L.
Combinatorial structure
In this section, we will introduce some combinatorial structure into our scheme. The combinatorial structure provides a predetermined arrangement of the servers which permits the possibility of reducing the computation of the scheme.
Set systems
A set system is a pair (X; B), where X is a set of n points and B is a collection of subsets of X called blocks. We will use a set system with the following properties, where t n 2 ? 1: 1. jBj t for any B 2 B. 2. For any subset F X with jFj t ? 1, there exists a B 2 B such that F \ B = ;. It is easy to see that such a set system exists. For example, we can choose B to be all the t-subsets of X. However, there are often better set systems (i.e., set systems containing fewer blocks). The following de nition is from 25].
De nition 5.1 A set system (X; B) is an (i; j)-disjunct system provided that, for any P; Q X such that jPj i; jQj j and P \ Q = ;, there exists a B 2 B such that P B and Q \ B = ;. An (i; j)-disjunct system, (X; B), will be denoted as an (i; j)-DS(n; s) if jXj = n and jBj = s.
It is easy to see that we can use (t; t?1)-DS(n; s) as our needed set system. 25] provided some e cient explicit constructions for (i; j)-DS(n; s) in which s is O((ij) log (n) (log n)).
Applying set system to the proactive VSS
Now we will use the set system to improve our proactive scheme. Suppose (X; B) is a set system satisfying the conditions of subsection 5.1, where X = f1; 2; ; ng; and B = fB 1 ; B 2 ; ; B s g. The set system is published so that each participant can consult it.
The idea of using the set system is to reduce the computations for the share renewal and share recover protocols. In the scheme of Section 4, share renewal and share recover used the data from all the participants. However, these operations can be carried out using the data from t good servers.
Note that in our scheme, in any phase there is a list L containing all the bad servers. By the property of the set system, there is a block B which contains only good servers. If the system can determine one of the \good" blocks, then the system can renew the shares or recover the shares only using the data from these servers. We will call these servers the members of an executive committee.
For a list L of bad servers, the system can decide following list of blocks: B i 1 ; B i 2 ; ; B ie , such that B i j \L = ;; j = 1; 2; ; e and 1 i 1 < i 2 < < i e s. These blocks are called executive committee candidates. Note that the adversary is mobile, therefore we cannot guarantee that these candidates contain only good servers in the next time period.
The proactive secret sharing scheme with combinatorial structure works as follows. The initialization is the same as that in Section 4. In each time period the system does the following. where r 00 = 0 and r ij = r ji for all i; j, and sends h (g) k (x) = r (g) (x; ! k ) to P k for k = 1; 2; ; n; k 6 = g by private channel and broadcasts h (c) P m checks whether h (c) A member in B is accused, then it can defend itself and the system can decide whether it is bad. If no member in B is bad, then B is de ned to be the executive committee.
3. The P k 2 L recovers its share using frc g k : g 2 Bg. 4 . Each server P l renews its share using frn g l : g 2 Bg.
